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the Survey-period from November 1, 2011 through October 31, 2013. The 
Article excludes cases involving federal–state conflicts; intrastate issues, 
such as subject matter jurisdiction and venue; and conflicts in time, such 
as the applicability of prior or subsequent law within a state. State and 
federal cases are discussed together because conflict of laws is mostly a 
state-law topic, except for a few constitutional limits, resulting in the same 
rules applying to most issues in state and federal courts.1 
Although no data are readily available to confirm this, Texas is no doubt 
a primary state in the production of conflict-of-laws precedents. This 
results not only from its size and population, but also from its placement 
bordering four states and a civil-law nation, and its significant 
international trade volume. Texas state and federal courts provide a 
fascinating study of conflicts issues every year, but the volume of case law 
now greatly exceeds this Survey’s ability to report on them, a function 
both of journal space and authors’ time. In addition, the current Survey 
covers two years and will accordingly limit its review to a few highlight 
cases and an examination of a couple of trends. 
The most notable highlight is a non-Texas case, which is nevertheless 
important because it comes from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
distinguishing the Circuit’s view on stream-of-commerce jurisdiction from 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent plurality in 2011.2 Choice-of-law cases 
include two interesting trends, one good and one bad. The good trend is 
Texas courts’ increasingly sophisticated use—notably in tort cases—of the 
variety of subject-specific sections in the Second Restatement of Conflict of 
Laws.3 The bad trend, holding over from the 2012 Survey, is the number 
of courts acquiescing to contractual choice of law clauses without the 
scrutiny required under Texas law and the Restatement.4 Along with these 
cases, the Survey-period produced a number of notable holdings discussed 
below. 
I.  FORUM CONTESTS 
Asserting jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant requires 
amenability to Texas jurisdiction and receipt of proper notice.5 
Amenability may be established by consent (usually based on a contract’s 
forum-selection clause), waiver (failing to make a timely objection), or 
extraterritorial service of process under a Texas long-arm statute.6 
Because most aspects of notice are purely matters of forum law,7 this 
 
 1. For a thorough discussion of the choice-of-law function in federal courts, see 
RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 722–72 (6th ed. 2010). 
 2. See infra notes 6–14. 
 3. See infra notes 162–78. 
 4. See infra notes 120–30. 
 5. James P. George et al., Conflict of Laws, 65 SMU L. REV. 391, 393 (2012) (discussing J. 
McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011)). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
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Article will focus primarily on the issues relating to amenability. 
Stream-of-commerce once again takes center stage, with nuanced 
opinions continuing to muddy the waters but not changing the law. The 
2012 Survey article highlighted the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in J. 
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, where the Court held New Jersey did 
not have personal jurisdiction over an English manufacturer in a products 
liability action brought by a man injured in New Jersey while using the 
manufacturer’s sole metal-shearing machine sold in New Jersey through a 
U.S. distributor.8 In 2013, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had to 
determine McIntyre’s impact on the Circuit’s stream-of-commerce 
approach in an action originating in a Mississippi federal court, reported 
here for its significance throughout the Fifth Circuit. 
Ainsworth v. Moffett Engineering, Ltd. was a products liability and 
wrongful death action against an Irish forklift manufacturer, Moffett, 
which objected to Mississippi jurisdiction for its lack of direct contacts 
with the forum.9 The district court rejected Moffett’s challenge but before 
appeal could be heard, the Supreme Court handed down McIntyre, 
requiring the Fifth Circuit to reevaluate its stream-of-commerce 
approach.10 The Fifth Circuit’s approach had been that minimum contacts 
are satisfied if the court “‘finds that the defendant delivered the product 
into the stream of commerce with the expectation that it would be 
purchased by or used by consumers in the forum state.’”11 This requires 
only foreseeability or awareness that the product will reach the forum, but 
“contacts must be more than ‘random, fortuitous, or attenuated, or of the 
unilateral activity of another party of third person.’”12 
The crux of whether McIntyre would change the Fifth Circuit approach 
rested on McIntyre’s plurality status, lacking a majority opinion or binding 
effect.13 Although the Supreme Court’s careful reasoning was an 
opportunity for courts to reconsider their analyses, the Fifth Circuit chose 
instead to look to the narrowest grounds for reaching the conclusion.14 
The plurality opinion, written by Justice Kennedy and joined by Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas, reasoned that a defendant 
has to target the forum and not merely predict that its products will reach 
there.15 Because the Fifth Circuit’s stream-of-commerce approach does 
not require targeting the forum, the court conceded its approach did not 
 
 8. Id. 
 9. Ainsworth v. Moffett Eng’g, Ltd., 716 F.3d 174, 175 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
644 (2013). 
 10. Id.; J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
 11. Ainsworth, 716 F.3d at 177 (quoting Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 
374 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 12. Ainsworth, 716 F.3d at 177 (quoting ITL Int’l, Inc. v. Constenla, S.A., 669 F.3d 493, 
498 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)). 
 13. Ainsworth, 716 F.3d at 176. 
 14. Id. at 178. 
 15. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2788. 
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meet the plurality’s requirement.16 Noting, however, that Justice Breyer 
did not join Justice Kennedy’s reasoning and instead concurred merely by 
applying precedent to the facts, the Fifth Circuit distinguished the 
Ainsworth facts.17 While McIntyre’s rejection of New Jersey jurisdiction 
was based on a single sale in the forum, Moffett’s distributor had sold 203 
of its forklifts worth $3,959,000.00 in Mississippi over a nearly ten-year 
span.18 
Just as McIntyre did not change the law, Ainsworth did not change the 
law in the Fifth Circuit. The McIntyre plurality left existing stream-of-
commerce jurisprudence intact, and the Fifth Circuit took advantage of 
that, along with a significant fact distinction, to keep its precedent intact.19 
With the Supreme Court denying certiorari to Ainsworth in November 
2013,20 defendants who hope for purposeful availment as the singular test 
for specific jurisdiction are no closer to their wish. 
A.  FORUM CLAUSES 
Contracting parties may agree to a forum-selection clause designating 
either an optional or the exclusive site for litigation or arbitration.21 When 
a contracting party sues in the designated forum, the clause is said to be a 
prorogation clause, that is, one supporting the forum’s jurisdiction over 
the contractually-consenting defendant.22 When a contracting party sues 
in a non-selected forum in violation of the contract, the clause is said to be 
a derogation clause, that is, one undermining the forum’s jurisdiction.23 
1.  Prorogating Forum Clauses 
Even though prorogation clauses tend to be routine because they 
establish the forum’s jurisdiction,24 two Survey-period cases raise 
noteworthy interpretation issues. In Bob Montgomery Chevrolet v. Dent 
Zone Cos.,25 the court rejected plaintiff’s argument for an incorporation-
by-reference forum clause. Dent, a Texas business specializing in paintless 
auto dent repairs, contracted with Kentucky-based Bob Montgomery 
Chevrolet (Montgomery) to be one of Dent’s certified repair centers where 
Dent’s technicians would work on cars brought to the Kentucky 
 
 16. Ainsworth, 716 F.3d at 178. 
 17. Id. at 178–79. 
 18. Id. at 179. 
 19. Id. at 177–79. 
 20. Moffett Eng’g, Ltd. v. Ainsworth, 134 S. Ct. 644 (2013). 
 21. PETER HAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 534 (5th ed. 2010). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. E.g., Office VP, LLC v. Ideal Health, Inc., No. A-11-CV-741 LY, 2012 WL 787041 (W.D. 
Tex. Mar. 6, 2012) (contract’s designation of Texas as exclusive forum subjected New York 
defendants to Texas jurisdiction in claim by website designer for unpaid service fees). 
 25. Bob Montgomery Chevrolet v. Dent Zone Cos., 409 S.W.3d 181, 193 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2013, no pet.). 
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dealership.26 When the relationship broke down, Dent sued Montgomery 
in Texas for breach of contract.27 The trial court found personal 
jurisdiction based on Dent’s form contract which cross-referenced a Dent 
website containing a forum selection clause.28 The court of appeals 
reversed and granted Montgomery’s special appearance, holding that the 
contract’s reference to the website could not be treated as Montgomery’s 
intent to be bound by the external agreement.29 
Bancroft Life & Casualty ICC, Ltd. v. FFD Resources III, LLC30 was an 
unusual instance where plaintiff’s primary claim was jurisdictionally valid 
in Texas, but defendant’s counterclaim was not because it was subject to a 
mandatory forum clause compelling litigation in St. Lucia, West Indies.31 
Plaintiff’s claim was distinguishable from defendant’s counterclaim 
because it was based on distinct loan documents executed in Texas and 
governed by Texas law.32 
Although not discussing forum clauses as such, the court in Adhikari v. 
Daoud & Partners33 held that an indemnity contract subjects the 
indemnitor to the indemnitee’s claim to enforce the agreement anywhere 
the indemnitee is sued.34 
2.  DEROGATING CLAUSES 
Courts generally enforce forum clauses naming another jurisdiction as 
the exclusive site for litigation or arbitration.35 Two Survey-period cases 
show why exclusive forum clauses may fail. 
Steakley v. Round One Investments, L.P.36 was an action for securities 
fraud regarding Texas plaintiffs’ investment in a California enterprise. The 
investment agreement included a mandatory California forum clause, but 
plaintiffs sued for fraud in Texas.37 The trial court granted defendants’ 
motion to dismiss because of the California clause, but the court of appeals 
 
 26. Id. at 184–85. 
 27. Id. at 184–86. 
 28. Id. at 197. 
 29. Id. at 188–97. 
 30. Bancroft Life & Cas. ICC, Ltd. v. FFD Res. III, LLC, No. H-11-2382, 2012 WL 5032111 
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2012). 
 31. Id. at *2. 
 32. Id. at *3. The opinion did not discuss whether the counterclaim was compulsory or 
permissive, but it was possibly permissive because it was related to distinct agreements, 
though not necessarily a distinct transaction. 
 33. Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, No. 09-cv-1237, 2012 WL 718933, at *6 (S.D. Tex. 
Mar. 5, 2012). 
 34. Id. 
 35. E.g., In re Counsel Fin. Servs., LLC, No. 13-12-00151-CV, 2013 WL 3895317, at *12 
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi July 25, 2013, no pet.) (memo op., not designated for 
publication) (dismissing in deference to New York choice-of-forum clause). 
 36. Steakley v. Round One Invs., L.P., No. 01-09-00022-CV, 2012 WL 3628800, at *1 
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 23, 2012, no pet.) (memo op., not designated for 
publication). 
 37. Id. at *1. 
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reversed on a finding that the claims did not fall within the forum clause’s 
scope.38 Brown v. Mesa Distributors, Inc.,39 arose from an equipment lease 
in which the lessee fell behind in payments. The lease had a forum clause 
stating that lessee Brown consented to jurisdiction in Pennsylvania, but 
did not restrict either party to filing there. When the lessor’s assignee sued 
in Texas to collect on overdue payments, the trial court upheld Texas 
jurisdiction because the forum clause was permissive rather than 
mandatory, and the court of appeals affirmed.40 
B.  TEXAS LONG-ARM AND MINIMUM CONTACTS 
Texas uses “limits-of-due-process” long-arm statutes, meaning that the 
minimum contacts test is the only necessary foundation for personal 
jurisdiction in Texas.41 The Texas long-arm statutes also apply in Texas 
federal courts, except where Congress has enacted a federal long-arm 
statute for certain federal law claims.42 
York v. Tropic Air, Ltd.,43 which provides the Survey-period’s most 
interesting analysis, found general jurisdiction over a Belize-based airline 
for a 2008 air crash in Belize that injured Texas residents. The court found 
general jurisdiction based on Tropic Air’s extensive Texas contacts, all 
unrelated to the accident which occurred in Belize.44 The only related 
Texas contact was that plaintiffs were Texas residents.45 The court 
carefully examined the historical bases for general jurisdiction in the 
Supreme Court’s only three opinions on the topic46 and contrasted Tropic 
Air’s strong Texas presence with the comparatively weaker presence of 
the Columbia-based defendant (also an air-transport business) in 
Helicopteros.47 Curiously missing in the court’s opinion is any reference to 
the Supreme Court’s recent “at home” standard for general jurisdiction, 
which requires the defendant’s forum contacts be so pervasive that 
defendant is essentially at home in the forum state.48 On the other hand, 
 
 38. Id. at *3–4. Accord Sunday Riley Modern Skin Care, LLC v. Maesa, No. H-12-1650, 
2013 WL 5231860, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2013) (finding consumer claims against New 
York cosmetics company fell outside of New York forum clause). 
 39. Brown v. Mesa Distribs., Inc., 414 S.W.3d 279, 281 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 
2013, no pet.). 
 40. Id. at 283–84. 
 41. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042 (West 2008). 
 42. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A). 
 43. York v. Tropic Air, Ltd., No. V-10-55, 2012 WL 1077198 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2012). 
 44. Id. at *3–5. 
 45. Id. at *4. 
 46. Id. at *1–3 (discussing Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); 
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); and Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011)). 
 47. Tropic Air, 2012 WL 1077198, at *14. 
 48. See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851; see also Akerblom v. Ezra Holdings, Ltd., 848 F. 
Supp. 2d 673 (S.D. Tex. 2012), aff’d, 509 F. App’x 340 (5th Cir. 2013) (no mention in trial 
court or appellate opinions of the at-home standard in courts’ rejection of general 
jurisdiction over Singapore-based companies for transactions centered there). 
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the court pointed out that Tropic Air’s chief executive officer had a home 
in Texas,49 which may be sufficient to meet the at-home standard. 
In other cases, Texas state and federal courts found jurisdiction over a 
Russian company regarding a trade secrets claim but not over a claim for 
tortious interference;50 a Kentucky company which ordered products 
from a Texas manufacturer and failed to pay after delivery to Kentucky;51 
and a Florida resident who was an officer of a Florida-based venture, in an 
action for fraud by defendant’s co-investor who lived in Texas.52 
Conversely, courts found no jurisdiction over two of three defendants in a 
Houston-based company’s claim for contract payments against Chinese 
companies with offices in Asia and Europe,53 a national fraternal 
organization for a dram shop claim arising from alcohol served at a local 
affiliate chapter,54 a Japanese company for failed electronic component 
that caused automobile accidents based on uncontrolled acceleration with 
twenty-four related cases consolidated in Houston,55 a New York non-
profit for tort claims arising in Israel,56 and a Georgia automotive repair 
shop for negligence that caused a later accident in Texas.57 
C.  FEDERAL LONG-ARM STATUTES AND NATIONWIDE CONTACTS 
Texas long-arm statutes apply in both state and federal courts in 
Texas58 except where Congress has enacted a federal long-arm statute59 
or where a foreign defendant lacks jurisdictional contacts with any state 
but has sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole.60 Three 
notable Survey-period cases were instructive about the reach and function 
of federal long-arm statutes. Grynberg v. BP P.L.C. is the most intricate 
discussion, analyzing both the federal long-arm and the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act,61 in denying jurisdiction for claims related to failed 
business dealings for oil and gas development in Kazakhstan.62 United 
 
 49. Tropic Air, 2012 WL 1077198, at *13. 
 50. Moncrief Oil Int’l, Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142, 147–48 (Tex. 2013). 
 51. Betafence USA LLC v. Davis Distrib., Inc., No. 3:12-CV-1478-B, 2012 WL 5182909, at 
*1, *7 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2012). 
 52. Fairchild v. Barot, 946 F. Supp. 2d 573, 575–76 (N.D. Tex. 2013). 
 53. Solid Sys. CAD Servs. v. Total Risc Tech., Pty. Ltd., No. H-12-03176, 2013 WL 
3787495, at *5–6 (S.D. Tex. July 18, 2013). 
 54. Grand Aerie Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Haygood, 402 S.W.3d 776, 778–82 (Tex. 
App.—Eastland 2013, no pet.) (also rejecting plaintiff’s argument for alter-ego jurisdiction 
between the national organization and its local affiliate). 
 55. DENSO Corp. v. Hall, 396 S.W.3d 681, 686 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, 
no pet.). 
 56. Weisskopf v. United Jewish Appeal-Fed’n of Jewish Philanthropies of N.Y., Inc., 889 
F. Supp. 2d 912, 916 (S.D. Tex. 2012). 
 57. Kawaja v. Crawford’s Auto Repair, 413 S.W.3d 194, 196 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 
2013, no pet.). 
 58. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4 (k)(1)(A); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.02 (West 2008). 
 59. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(D). 
 60. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2). 
 61. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–11 (2012). 
 62. Grynberg v. BP P.L.C., 855 F. Supp. 2d 625 (S.D. Tex. 2012). 
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States ex rel. Tucker v. Christus Health63 offers a proper contrast to 
Grynberg’s detailed analysis with a quick-but-proper finding of 
jurisdiction over Georgia-based medical facilities in a qui tam action. 64 
The plaintiff had worked only in Georgia. Although the Georgia 
defendants’ alleged fraud was related to actions by Texas defendants, the 
court pointed out that the only necessary finding was that the Georgia 
defendants had contacts with the United States and that the lack of Texas 
contacts was irrelevant.65 
SuperMedia, Inc. v. Foy66 illustrated a third feature of federal long-arm 
statutes—their limited scope. This was an employer’s declaratory 
judgment action against retirees, seeking a declaration that its retirement 
plan amendments complied with federal law under ERISA.67 Plaintiffs 
were a group of companies with a common Texas base whose employee 
benefits plans were governed by Texas law.68 Several defendants (that is, 
employees or retirees) who did not live or work in Texas challenged 
personal jurisdiction. The court held that ERISA’s nationwide federal long-
arm statute did not apply to the alleged facts and that jurisdiction over 
these non-resident employee-defendants was lacking,69 which shifted the 
analysis to traditional minimum contacts, which also did not capture these 
defendants.70 
D.  INTERNET-BASED JURISDICTION 
A number of American jurisdictions, including Texas and the Fifth 
Circuit, apply the Zippo sliding scale to assess personal jurisdiction based 
on Internet contacts.71 The Survey-period produced several cases in which 
plaintiffs based their jurisdictional argument significantly on Internet 
 
 63. United States ex rel. Tucker v. Christus Health, No. 09-1819, 2012 WL 5351212, at 
*2 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 23, 2012). 
 64. See id. at *1 n.1. Qui tam is a shortened form of a Latin term of art for false claims for 
government reimbursement, governed by the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3732(a). 
 65. Tucker, 2012 WL 535121, at *2. 
 66. SuperMedia, Inc. v. Foy, No. 3:12-CV-2034-G, 2013 WL 4014453 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 
2013). 
 67. Id. at *1. (ERISA stands for The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461. (2012 & Supp. I. 2013). 
 68. Id. at *9. 
 69. Id. at *2–6 (interpreting the ERISA long arm statute, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2)). 
 70. Id. at *6–9. 
 71. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
The test breaks down Internet use into a spectrum of three areas. Id. One end of the 
spectrum finds the defendant clearly doing business in the forum based on contracts 
repeatedly entered into with forum residents; the spectrum’s other end is passive websites 
not involving the defendant’s intentional contact with the forum and not leading to 
jurisdiction. Id. The spectrum’s difficult middle involves the forum resident’s exchange of 
information with the defendant’s host computer, and jurisdiction is based on the level of 
interactivity and the commercial nature of the information exchanged. Id. The Fifth Circuit 
adopted the Zippo test in Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999). Texas 
appellate courts have used it as well. See, e.g., Townsend v. Univ. Hosp.–Univ. of Colo., 83 
S.W.3d 913, 922 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. denied); Experimental Aircraft Ass’n v. 
Doctor, 76 S.W.3d 496, 506-07 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.). 
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activity. 
Although several cases involved routine Zippo analysis,72 two cases 
indicated the relevance of the websites’ related businesses, hotel 
reservations and higher education to the contacts analysis. In Diem v. 
Quinn Hotel Praha, A.S., Texas-resident Diem sued the owners of a hotel in 
Prague, Czech Republic, for injuries suffered during her stay which she 
booked over the hotel’s website.73 The court found the website to be 
intermediate under Zippo and looked at the extent of the site’s 
interactivity and the nature of the forum contacts.74 First, the court 
recognized the uniqueness of hotel reservation websites.75 The court then 
found no specific jurisdiction because Diem’s mere accessibility to a 
website did not purposely direct its contact to Texas and Diem’s use of the 
website was not the but-for causation of her injuries.76 
American University System, Inc. v. American University involved 
educational institutions’ websites.77 Plaintiff sought a declaratory 
judgment in Texas federal court that it did not infringe on trademarks of a 
D.C. university and a West Virginia distance learning instruction 
provider.78 Under a general jurisdiction inquiry, the court noted that 
activities typical of national prominent universities are not contacts that 
subject educational institutions to jurisdiction.79 The fact that the 
defendants had intermediate websites that, among other activities typical 
to universities, sold products to Texas residents did not subject the 
defendants to general personal jurisdiction.80 
Perhaps the novelty, as well as the mystery, of the Internet has worn off 
for the Fifth Circuit. In Pervasive Software, Inc. v. Lexware GmbH & Co. Kg, a 
breach of contract action, the court emphasized the jurisdictional inquiry 
can still be completed using the traditional personal jurisdiction 
analysis.81 Courts should evaluate cases on a case-by-case basis, and the 
Zippo test simply aids the determination of purposeful conduct.82 
 
 72. See York v. Tropic Air, Ltd., No. V-10-55, 2012 WL 1077198, at *3–16 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 
28, 2012); Driving Force Techs., Inc. v. Panda Distrib., Inc., No. 4:10-cv-24, 2012 WL 
1645634, at *1–8 (E.D. Tex. May 10, 2012); Kidwai v. St. Matthew’s Univ. Sch. of Med., No. H-
12-455, 2012 WL 2403516, at *1–2 (S.D. Tex. June 22, 2012); Ward v. Rhode, No. 
6:11CV531, 2012 WL 4499307, at *3–8 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 7, 2012); Knight Corp. v. Knight, 367 
S.W.3d 715, 725–31 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.); Washington DC Party 
Shuttle, LLC v. IGuide Tours, 406 S.W.3d 723, 727–28, 731–39 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 
Dist.] 2012, pet. denied). 
 73. Diem v. Quinn Hotel Praha, A.S., No. H-10-2848, 2012 WL 524182, at *1 (S.D. Tex. 
Feb. 15, 2012). 
 74. Id. at *2. 
 75. Id. at *3. 
 76. Id. at *2–4. 
 77. Am. Univ. Sys., Inc. v. Am. Univ., 858 F. Supp. 2d 705, 708 (N.D. Tex. 2012). 
 78. Id. at 708–09. 
 79. Id. at 713–14. 
 80. Id. at 712–16. 
 81. Pervasive Software, Inc. v. Lexware GmbH & Co. Kg, 688 F.3d 214, 226–27 (5th Cir. 
2012). 
 82. Id. 
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E.  FORUM NON CONVENIENS 
Forum non conveniens, or inconvenient forum, is an old common-law 
objection to jurisdiction based on significant inconvenience to one or 
more defendants.83 It is also available by statute in the federal system and 
in many states for intra-jurisdictional transfers that do not require 
dismissal.84 Where interstate or international case movement is involved, 
forum non conveniens is truly jurisdictional because it involves the 
forum’s declining of otherwise-valid jurisdiction, as well as the dismissal 
of the local case, for refiling in a distinct forum.85 
Because intra-federal transfers under § 1404 do not implicate conflicts 
between states or nations, they are not considered here, even though such 
transfers may involve significant distances. This Article is limited to inter-
jurisdictional forum non conveniens under the common law which is 
available in state and federal courts in Texas under the same two-part test 
requiring the movant to show the availability of an adequate alternative 
forum and that a balancing of private and public interests favors 
transfer.86 
While the courts granted the majority of motions to dismiss for forum 
non conveniens during the Survey-period, the Southern District of Texas 
denied a dismissal for forum non conveniens, but it granted an alternative 
motion to stay in one noteworthy case, MacDermid Offshore Solutions, LLC 
v. Niche Products, LLC.87 This case involved causes of action filed in both 
the Southern District of Texas and the Patents County Court in England, 
 
 83. Alexander Reus, Judicial Discretion: A Comperative View of The Doctrine of Forum 
Non Conveniens in The United States, The United Kingdom, and Germany, 16 LOY. L.A. INT’L & 
COMP. L.J., 455, 459–60 (1994). 
 84. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2012) is the federal statutory provision for inconvenient forum 
objections seeking transfer to another federal court. Texas law provides for in-state venue 
transfers based on convenience under TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.002(b) (West 
2002). 
 85. 14 Sonja Larsen, et al., Tex. Jur. 3d Courts § 45 (1996 & Supp. 2014). 
 86. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 
454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981); McLennan v. Am. Eurocopter Corp., 245 F.3d 403, 424 (5th Cir. 
2001). The private factors look to the parties’ convenience and include the “relative ease of 
access to sources of proof; [the] availability of compulsory process for attendance of 
unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witness[es]; [the] possibility of 
view of premises, if . . . appropriate . . . ; and all other practical problems that make trial of a 
case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Dickson 
Marine, Inc. v. Panalpina, Inc., 179 F.3d 331, 342 (5th Cir. 1999)). The public factors look to 
the courts’ concerns and the forum state’s interests, and include the “‘administrative 
difficulties flowing from court congestion; the local interest in having localized 
controversies decided at home; the interest in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum 
that is at home with the law that must govern the action; the avoidance of unnecessary 
problems in conflict of laws; and the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum 
with jury duty.’” Id. Texas forum non conveniens law is multi-faceted. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. 
CODE ANN. § 71.051 (West 2008) applies to personal injury and wrongful death claims. 
Common-law forum non conveniens, in line with Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, governs all other 
interstate and international forum convenience issues in Texas state courts. See In re Smith 
Barney, Inc., 975 S.W.2d 593, 596 (Tex. 1998). 
 87. MacDermid Offshore Solutions, LLC v. Niche Prods., LLC, No. 4:12-CV-2483, 2013 
WL 3980870, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2013). 
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with both actions having a underlying allegation of fraud by two 
competing manufacturers and sellers of hydraulic fluid, Niche Products 
Ltd, a British Company, and MacDermid, a Delaware limited liability 
company with a place of business in Texas.88 While the district court 
found the English court both available and adequate,89 the court found 
that the resulting equal balance of relevant private and public interest 
factors did not favor dismissal.90 Although the district court acknowledged 
the English court was an appropriate court to rule on the paramount issue 
of fact, that is whether MacDermid’s two hydraulic fluids were materially 
different from each other, the court was unwilling to grant dismissal.91 
The court reasoned that if it granted dismissal and the English court found 
the issue of fact in MacDermid’s favor, MacDermid would no longer have 
access to the American courts to seek recompense although the favorable 
finding of fact would indicate it would prevail in its claims in the district 
court.92 Consequently, the district court granted a stay to allow the English 
court to rule and leave the American court’s door open for relief if the 
issue of fact favored MacDermid.93 
In Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Transit Mix Concrete & Materials Co.,94 
a construction worker was injured at the Texarkana airport, located in 
Arkansas, resulting in two lawsuits—Liberty Mutual’s subrogation claim 
for worker’s compensation payments, filed in Texas, and the victim’s 
direct action filed in Arkansas. In the Texas case, Transit Mix moved for a 
forum non conveniens dismissal for refiling in Arkansas, which the trial 
court granted and Liberty Mutual appealed. The Dallas Court of Appeals 
affirmed in an interesting discussion of the distinction between statutory 
and common law forum non conveniens,95 and a thoroughly-explained 
choice of law decision that Arkansas law governed the immediate 
subrogation issues.96 
Routine forum-non-conveniens analyses included dismissals in favor of 
courts in (1) Israel regarding a partnership dispute;97 (2) Peru for a 
 
 88. Id. at *1–2. 
 89. Id. at *8. 
 90. Id. at *9. 
 91. Id. at *10. 
 92. Id. at *9–10. 
 93. Id. at *10–11. 
 94. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Transit Mix Concrete & Materials Co., No. 96-12-00117-CV, 
2013 WL 3329026, at *1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana June 28, 2013, pet. denied). 
 95. In Texas, forum non conveniens issues regarding personal injury are statutory, see 
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 71.051 (West 2008), while generic commercial disputes are 
covered by common law principles. Liberty Mut., 2013 WL 3329026, at *1. Transit Mix 
argued for common law governance but the court held that the personal injury statute 
governed because the Texas dispute was derivative of the Arkansas personal injury case. Id. 
at *1–2. 
 96. Consistent with the well-done opinions noted in the tort choice of law section 
below, the court applied the Restatement’s sections 145 (the general tort principle), 146 
(personal injury), as well as section 6’s most significant relationship test. See id. at *3–8. 
 97. SES Prods., Inc. v. Aroma Classique, LLC, No. 01-12-00219-CV, 2013 WL 2456797 
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 6, 2013, no pet.). 
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wrongful death action arising from an oil tanker explosion in Peruvian 
coastal waters;98 (3) New Zealand for a breach of warranties action arising 
from an acquisition agreement;99 (4) Canada for misappropriation of 
trade secrets in two related actions;100 and (5) Australia for a breach of 
contract action involving a joint development agreement to exploit and 
sell in North America proprietary software encryption technology owned 
by an Australian company.101 
II.  CHOICE OF LAW 
Choosing the applicable substantive law is a question, like personal 
jurisdiction and judgment enforcement, involving both forum law and 
constitutional issues. Understanding these issues requires a clear focus on 
basic principles. First, choice of law is a question of state law both in state 
and federal courts.102 Second, it is a question of forum law. Renvoi—the 
practice of using another state’s choice-of-law rule—is almost never 
employed unless the forum state directs it, and even then, the forum state 
remains in control.103 Third, the forum state has broad power to make 
choice-of-law decisions, either legislatively or judicially, subject only to 
limited constitutional requirements.104 
Within the forum state’s control of choice of law is a hierarchy of 
choice-of-law rules. At the top are legislative choice-of-law rules, that is, 
statutes directing the application of a certain state’s laws, based on events 
or people important to the operation of each specific law.105 Second in the 
choice-of-law hierarchy is party-controlled choice of law, that is, choice-of-
law clauses in contracts that control unless public policy dictates 
 
 98. In re BPZ Res., Inc., 359 S.W.3d 866 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, orig. 
proceeding [mand. denied]). 
 99. Royal Ten Cate USA, Inc. v. TTAH Trust Co., No. A-11-CA-1057 LY, 2013 WL 56151 
(W.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2013). 
 100. Logan Int’l, Inc. v. 1556311 Alberta Ltd., 929 F. Supp. 2d 625 (S.D. Tex. 2012); Logan 
Int’l Inc. v. SureTech Completions (USA), Inc., No. H-13-0492, 2013 WL 3005592 (S.D. Tex. 
June 10, 2013). 
 101. K2M3, LLC v. Cocoon Data Holding Pty. Ltd., No. 13-11-00194-CV, 2012 WL 
2469705 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi June 28, 2012, pet. denied). 
 102. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496–97 (1941). 
 103. The Restatement (Second) creates a presumption against renvoi except for limited 
circumstances. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 8 (1971). Although 
commentators defend the limited use of renvoi, they acknowledge its general lack of 
acceptance in the United States except in limited circumstances, usually found in statutes 
directing the use of renvoi. See HAY ET AL., supra note 21, at 162–68; WEINTRAUB, supra note 
1, at 102–09. Texas law provides for renvoi in specified sections of the Uniform Commercial 
Code. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.301(b) (West 2009) (identifying nine sections in 
which Texas courts must look to the choice of law rule of another state). For federal courts, 
Klaxon reiterates the forum state’s control of choice of law. Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496–97. 
 104. See infra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(1), cmt. a (1971); see, e.g., Owens 
Corning v. Carter, 997 S.W.2d 560, 564 (Tex. 1999) (applying an earlier version of the Texas 
wrongful death statute requiring the court to “apply the rules of substantive law that are 
appropriate under the facts of the case”) (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031 
(West 2008) (as amended in 1997 with the same wording as this provision)). 
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otherwise.106 Third in the hierarchy is the common law, now controlled in 
Texas by the most significant relationship test of the Restatement 
(Second) of Conflict of Laws.107 This Survey article is organized according 
to this hierarchy, that is, statutory choice of law, followed by choice-of-law 
clauses, and concluding with choice of law under the most significant 
relationship test. This grouping of cases results in a discussion that mixes 
Texas Supreme Court opinions with those of Texas intermediate appellate 
courts, federal district courts, and the Fifth Circuit. In spite of this mix, 
readers should of course note that to the extent choice of law is a state 
issue (that is, except for constitutional issues), the only binding opinions 
are those of the Texas Supreme Court.108 
A.  STATUTORY CHOICE-OF-LAW RULES 
Statutory choice-of-law rules express a public policy interest that 
overrides the multi-factor considerations in typical choice-of-law analyses 
or the party autonomy principal in contract disputes. Some choice-of-law 
statutes compel the application of Texas law and some the application of 
another state’s or nation’s law. In each case, the application of law is based 
on a designated event or relationship deemed paramount. 
A common example of a statute designating forum law is the Texas 
Insurance Code, which directs the application of Texas law to any 
insurance contract payable to “any citizen or inhabitant of this state by 
any insurance company or corporation doing business within this 
State.”109 Preferred Contractors Insurance Co. Risk Retention Group, LLC v. 
Oyoque Masonry, Inc.,110 an insurer’s declaratory judgment action for non-
coverage of a truck driver’s injury, is a good example of Texas law 
displacing the contract’s chosen law on an issue of interpretation. Finnels 
was a truck driver who worked as an independent contractor for Gulf 
Coast Express, a company owned by Jose Oyoque, who also owned Oyoque 
Masonry, Inc. (OMI).111 Finnels was injured while unloading a concrete 
wall, built by OMI, which Finnels was delivering to the installation site. 
The opinion provides no geographic information, but the setting is 
 
 106. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1988) (Law of the State 
Chosen by the Parties) (allowing contracting parties to choose a governing law, within 
defined limits). Texas has adopted § 187. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 
677–78 (Tex. 1990). 
 107. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971) (listing the seven 
balancing factors for the most significant relationship test). 
 108. The exception is when a court rules on a constitutional issue, such as legislative 
jurisdiction or full faith and credit. See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. LaPray, 135 S.W.3d 
657, 680 (Tex. 2004) (legislative jurisdiction); Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. 
Chi. Bridge & Iron Co., 406 S.W.3d 326 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013, pet. denied) (full faith 
and credit). 
 109. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.42 (West 2009). 
 110. Preferred Contractors Ins. Co. Risk Retention Grp., LLC v. Oyoque Masonry, Inc., No. 
4:12-CV-1406, 2013 WL 3899332 (S.D. Tex. July 26, 2013). 
 111. Id. at *1. 
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apparently Texas where OMI is based112 and where two lawsuits were 
filed related to Finnels’s injury. Finnels filed the first action in a Texas 
state court in Galveston, suing Gulf Coast and OMI.113 When OMI’s insurer, 
Preferred Contractors, refused to defend or indemnify OMI in the 
Galveston suit, OMI filed this action in a federal court in Houston.114 
Preferred Contractors had declined coverage based on the insurance 
contract’s exclusion of employment-based claims, including those of 
independent contractors like Finnels.115 OMI argued that the insurance 
contract was governed by its designated Montana law, under which 
Finnels’s employment relationship was limited to Gulf Coast, making him a 
covered third-party in relation to OMI.116 The federal court found this to 
be a straightforward application of the Texas Insurance Code’s directive 
(further indicating a Texas setting for the injury) and used Texas law to 
interpret coverage in Preferred’s favor.117 
In contrast to forum-directed statutes, the internal affairs doctrine is an 
example of a statute designating what is often non-forum law for claims 
based on a corporation’s internal affairs.118 U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. 
Verizon Communications, Inc.119 involved claims against Verizon and 
others for breach of fiduciary duty and promoter liability. In 2006 Verizon 
spun off its domestic directories business to create Idearc, Inc. When 
Idearc failed and filed for bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court appointed U.S. 
Bank as litigation trustee to pursue claims against Verizon and others 
involved in Idearc’s founding and alleged wrongs afterward.120 On the 
claims of breach of fiduciary duty and promoter liability, the litigation 
trustee argued that the most-significant-relationship test dictated the 
application of New York or Texas law which supported the trustee’s 
claims.121 Verizon successfully countered that the Texas choice-of-law rule 
was trumped by the Texas statute codifying the internal affairs doctrine 
which invalidated trustee’s argument on these claims.122 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at *1 n.2. 
 114. Id. at *1. 
 115. Id. at *1–2. 
 116. Id. at *2. 
 117. Id. Without analyzing Montana law, the court also speculated that the result would 
not differ under Montana law. Id. 
 118. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 1.102 (West 2012). 
 119. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 2d 805 (N.D. Tex. 
2012). 
 120. Id. at 807. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 827–28; see also Collins v. Sydow (In re NC12, Inc.), 478 B.R. 820 (Bankr. S.D. 
Tex. 2012) (applying Nevada law as the incorporating state to determine whether the 
shareholders’ claims were theirs to raise in a collateral action or were direct injuries 
assertable only by the debtor company); ExxonMobil Global Servs. Co. v. Gensym Corp., No. 
1:12-CV-442-JDR, 2013 WL1314461 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2013) (applying Delaware law to 
determine the alter ego issue between defendant Gensym and its parent corporation which 
plaintiff sought to add as defendant). 
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Barrash v. American Ass’n of Neurological Surgeons, Inc.123 illustrates 
that not every internal dealing falls under the internal affairs doctrine. 
Plaintiff Barrash is a medical doctor in Illinois who was cited for 
professional misconduct by defendant American Association of 
Neurological Surgeons (AANS).124 When Barrash lost an internal appeal 
within AANS, he sued AANS for breach of contract and related tort 
claims.125 Responding to AANS’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim, Barrash argued that his contract claim under AANS’s bylaws should 
be governed by Illinois law as the state of AANS’s incorporation.126 The 
court rejected this, explaining that in this instance the bylaws operated as 
a contract with plaintiff, a non-board member.127 This shifted the analysis 
from the internal affairs doctrine to the Restatement’s section 301 which 
called for the application of the law with the most significant relationship 
to the dispute, which the court found to be Texas as the place where the 
pertinent facts and possible injury occurred.128 
Some areas of law have both forum-directed and foreign-directed 
choice-of-law statutes. One example is child support, which falls under 
both state and federal statutes governing several issues. This can result in 
contrasting policies where the controlling state may be the one issuing the 
original child support order or the state currently enforcing that order. In 
re Lamar129 was a claim by the Texas attorney general in bankruptcy 
court, seeking to exempt from discharge the interest the debtor allegedly 
owed on back child support. The child support was originally ordered in 
Florida in 1979. When debtor Lamar moved from Florida to Texas, he fell 
behind in child support payments which in 1996 resulted in a Texas 
judgment under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA).130 
The court noted that since his earlier arrearage, Lamar had paid the back 
support and kept it current—the dispute was over interest allegedly 
accrued, which varied according to which state’s law controlled.131 In 
managing the UIFSA judgment over the years, the State of Texas calculated 
interest at the twelve percent rate under Texas law.132 The bankruptcy 
court deemed this error because of the Texas Family Code’s choice-of-law 
rule requiring that interest on foreign child support judgments be 
calculated under Florida law as the state issuing the original judgment. 
Under the proper Florida calculation, Lamar’s payments exceeded his 
 
 123. Barrash v. Am. Ass’n of Neurological Surgeons, Inc., No. 4:13-cv-1054, 2013 WL 
4401429 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2013). 
 124. Id. at *1. 
 125. Id. at *1–2. 
 126. Id. at *1. 
 127. Id. at *6. 
 128. Id. at *5–6. 
 129. In re Lamar, No. 1234034, 2012 WL 5985324 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Nov. 29, 2012). 
 130. Id. at *1–2, *3 n.1 (citing the Texas UIFSA, TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 159.001–.901 
(West 2008)). 
 131. Id. at *3–4. 
 132. Id. at *4. 
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obligation, and the court thus denied the claim by the State of Texas.133 
Norman v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc.134 offers a different 
choice-of-law result on a child support issue. Norman’s complaint was that 
Experian was reporting delinquent child support obligations that were 
more than seven years old and thus exempt from credit reports under 
federal law.135 According to Norman, the original support orders were 
from Shelby County, Tennessee and were later domesticated in Illinois 
when Norman moved there.136 After several complaints to Experian 
starting in 2008, Norman eventually sued Experian for false credit 
reporting under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.137 The issue was whether 
subsequently-issued child support judgments were new judgments and 
thus reportable, or judgments that became unreportable after seven 
years.138 Norman argued that Tennessee law controlled as the original 
issuing state and that under Tennessee law the judgments were not 
new.139 Illinois law, on the other hand, treated each successive judgment 
as new and thus still reportable.140 Applying a federal choice-of-law rule 
under the full-faith-and-credit statute governing child support, the court 
ruled that Illinois law governed because it was the state of Norman’s 
residence and thus the enforcing state.141 
Texas family law also offers an example of a forum-directed statute. 
Tener v. Short Carter Morris, LLP was a legal malpractice claim arising 
from a Texas divorce involving a Colorado husband.142 Tener’s wife had 
moved to Houston where she filed for divorce.143 Tener hired the 
defendant law firm to represent him in the Texas case and afterward sued 
for malpractice. Among other claims, Tener argued that his lawyers failed 
to offer the court adequate proof of Colorado law regarding Tener’s claim 
to marital property.144 In making this argument, Tener relied on a line of 
Texas cases that were superseded in 2003 when the Texas legislature 
amended the Family Code to provide that Texas law governs the 
characterization of property acquired by a spouse in another state.145 The 
trial court ruled for defendant law firm on this issue and the court of 
 
 133. Id. at *5. 
 134. Norman v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., No. 3:12-CV-128-B, 2013 WL 1774625 
(N.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2013). 
 135. See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 1681c(a)(4) (West 2009). 
 136. Norman, 2013 WL 1774625, at *4. The facts are vague because Norman, a pro se 
plaintiff, argued several choice-of-law points without supporting evidence, including 
arguing for Tennessee as the originating forum. Id. at *4 n.2. The court assumed the validity 
of Norman’s assertions as a basis of ruling against him. 
 137. Id. at *3. Norman also sued the Illinois official in charge of child support collections. 
 138. Id. at *5. 
 139. Id. at *4. 
 140. Id. at *4–5. 
 141. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738(b)(1) (West 2005)). 
 142. Tener v. Short Carter Morris, LLP, No. 01-12-00676-CV, 2013 WL 4007802 (Tex. 
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 6, 2013, no pet.). 
 143. Id. at *1. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at *1. 
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appeals affirmed.146 
Logic suggests that statutes based on uniform laws would not require 
choice-of-law provisions, and as is often true, logic fails in legal reasoning. 
In BMW Financial Services, N.A., LLC v. Rio Grande Valley Motors, Inc.,147 
BMW sued to foreclose on secured property held by two car dealerships in 
McAllen, Texas. The court applied a Texas UCC choice-of-law statute 
subjecting the perfection of security interests to the law of the state of the 
debtor’s location,148 which in turn is defined as the state where the debtor 
is organized.149 Because the dealer was a Delaware corporation, that 
state’s law governed issues regarding perfection.150 
B.  THE MOST SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP TEST 
In the absence of a statutory choice-of-law rule, Texas courts apply the 
most significant relationship test, a seven-factor balancing test from the 
Restatement.151 
1.  Choice-of-Law Clauses in Contracts 
Texas law and the Restatement permit contracting parties to choose a 
governing law,152 which is reflected in forty-eight Survey-period cases. 
Thirty-five of those cases involve the courts’ summary acquiescence to the 
parties’ choice of law with little or no analysis, a judicial practice also 
noted in the 2012 Conflicts Survey.153 It may be tempting to accept this 
practice with the idea that the parties’ choice should be presumed valid, 
especially in the absence of a party’s objection and adequate opposing 
argument. The Restatement, however, makes it clear that parties’ 
contractual choices of law do not control unless (1) the choice bears a 
reasonable relationship to the dispute, and (2) the result does not 
contravene a fundamental interest of a jurisdiction with a materially 
 
 146. Id. at *9 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.002(b) (West 2006)). 
 147. BMW Fin. Servs., N.A., LLC v. Rio Grande Valley Motors, Inc., No. M-11-292, 2012 WL 
4623198 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 1, 2012). 
 148. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.301(1) (West 2011). 
 149. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.307(e) (West Supp. 2013). 
 150. BMW Fin. Servs., 2012 WL 4623198, at *8. 
 151. The embodiment of the most significant relationship test are within the seven 
factors to be balanced according to the needs of the particular case. They are: “(a) the needs 
of the interstate and international systems; (b) the relevant policies of the forum; (c) the 
relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the 
determination of the particular issue; (d) the protection of justified expectations; (e) the 
basic policies underlying the particular field of law; (f) certainty, predictability and 
uniformity of result; and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be 
applied.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (1971). This listing is not by 
priority, which varies from case to case. Id. at cmt. c. In a larger sense, the most significant 
relationship test includes the other choice-of-law sections throughout the Restatement. 
 152. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677 (Tex. 1990); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971). 
 153. See George, et al., supra note 5, at 409–10. The thirty-five cases, on file with the 
authors, comprise twenty-seven cases from federal district courts in Texas and eight cases 
from Texas intermediate state appellate courts. 
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greater interest. Case law in both Texas154 and federal155 courts adopt the 
Restatement’s structured view. 
One of the acquiescing opinions offers insight into a source for the 
error, which not surprisingly is an earlier opinion misstating the law. Yesh 
Music v. Lakewood Church156 was a copyright infringement action alleging 
that a Houston-based religious broadcaster exceeded the parties’ licensing 
agreement on certain songs. The license designated British Columbia law 
as controlling.157 The court appropriately noted that as a copyright claim, 
this was a federal question that invoked a choice-of-law rule from federal 
common law rather than the local state’s rule, and federal common law 
used the Restatement.158 The court then drew from a 1997 Fifth Circuit 
opinion—Mitsui & Co. (USA) Inc. v. Mira M/V—that “choice-of-law clauses 
are presumatively valid.”159 The Mitsui opinion took the error further, 
stating that “[t]he Supreme Court has consistently held forum-selection 
and choice-of-law clauses presumptively valid,” citing four cases in 
support, all dealing with forum-selection clauses and none dealing with 
choice-of-law clauses.160 Further analysis requires more space than the 
Survey affords, but the correct view is stated in both Fifth Circuit and 
Texas Supreme Court opinions cited above.161 The Yesh opinion did 
attempt a Restatement analysis, finding that the transaction had a 
reasonable relationship to British Columbia.162 But in doing so, the 
opinion confused Restatement sections 187(1) and 187(2). Section 187(1) 
allows contracting parties to designate a controlling law for any issues 
that could have been resolved explicitly in the contract and does not 
require a reasonable relationship between the chosen law and the facts 
underlying the contract.163 Section 187(2), on the other hand, sets the 
guidelines for contracting parties designating a law for issues that could 
not have been explicitly resolved in the contract and imposes the 
 
 154. See DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 677–81. 
 155. Provident Fin., Inc. v. Strategic Energy L.L.C., 404 Fed. App’x 835, 839 (5th Cir. 
2010) (per curiam) (citing Int’l Interests, L.P. v. Hardy, 448 F.3d 303, 306–07 (5th Cir. 
2006); Griffin v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, No. H-09-03842, 2011 WL 675285, at *1 
(S.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2011) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) 
(1971)). 
 156. Yesh Music v. Lakewood Church, No. 4:11-CV-03095, 2012 WL 524187 (S.D. Tex. 
Feb. 14, 2012). 
 157. Id. at *4. 
 158. Id. at *3. 
 159. Id. (citing Mitsui & Co. (USA) Inc. v. Mira M/V, 111 F.3d 33, 35 (5th Cir 1997)). 
 160. Mitsui, 111 F.3d at 35 (citing Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 
515 U.S. 528 (1995)); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991); M/S Bremen 
v. Zapata Off–Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); Kevlin Servs., Inc. v. Lexington State Bank, 46 
F.3d 13 (5th Cir. 1995); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
614 (1985). 
 161. See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text. 
 162. Yesh Music v. Lakewood Church, No. 4:11-CV-03095, 2012 WL 524187, at *3 (S.D. 
Tex. Feb. 14, 2012). 
 163. See DCS Sanitation Mgmt., Inc. v. Castillo, 475 F.3d 892, 896–97 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(discussing the difference between RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 187(1), 
187(2)). 
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reasonable relationship test, along with not contravening the fundamental 
interests of a state with a greater relationship.164 In basing its analysis on 
section 187(1), the opinion also failed to identify the issue that the parties 
could have resolved in the contract.165 
Two of the Survey-period’s best examples of contract-clause analysis 
are in personal injury cases with collateral contract issues. Williams-Smith 
v. Designers Edge, Inc.166 offers a textbook application of Restatement 
sections 187 and 188, negating the parties’ chosen law for violating 
Washington law. The underlying case was an action to recover damages 
for burns from the explosion of a halogen work lamp at a work site in 
Texas.167 The accident killed one worker and severely burned two 
others.168 After the accident, the lamp’s manufacturer—Designers Edge—
sold its assets to Coleman Cable, Inc. (Coleman) with an asset purchase 
agreement designating Illinois law as controlling. Ordinarily that 
contract’s impact would rest only on Designers Edge and Coleman.169 But 
in this case, the plaintiffs—third parties to the contract—sought successor 
liability from purchaser Coleman, and the acquisition agreement 
controlled that issue.170 Coleman moved for summary judgment on the 
grounds that both Texas forum law and the contract’s designated Illinois 
law made them immune.171 Washington law did not, under the “product 
line exception” apply to asset transfers, which Washington recognized and 
the other states did not.172 Plaintiffs argued that Washington law 
controlled as the home state of Designers Edge and the locale of the sale to 
Coleman.173 In an excellent analysis of Restatement sections 187 and 188, 
the court ruled that Washington had greater interest than either Texas 
(the forum state and accident situs) or Illinois (the contract’s designated 
law), thus rejecting Coleman’s motion for summary judgment.174 
CMA-CGM (America), Inc. v. Empire Truck Lines, Inc.175 was an action for 
 
 164. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677–81 (Tex. 1990) (discussing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)). 
 165. Yesh Music, 2012 WL 524187, at *3. Two Survey–period cases did a partly correct 
law-clause analysis, in each case requiring the adequate relationship between the dispute 
and the chosen law, but failing to require a showing that the chosen law did not contravene 
a fundamental interest of a state with a greater interest. Gernsbacher v. Campbell (In re 
Equip. Equity Holdings, Inc.), 491 B.R. 792 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2013); In re Texas Rangers 
Baseball Partners, No. 10-43400-DML, 2012 WL 4464550 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2012). 
 166. Williams-Smith v. Designers Edge, Inc., No. G–10–590, 2012 WL 1201926 (S.D. Tex. 
Apr. 10, 2012). 
 167. Id. at *1. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at *1–2. 
 173. Id. at *2. 
 174. Id. at *3–4. In a subsequent ruling on Coleman’s claim of indemnity against 
Designers Edge, the court found false conflict among Washington, Texas, and Illinois 
because this indemnity claim would be recognized in all three states. See Williams-Smith v. 
Designers Edge, Inc., No. G-10-00590, 2012 WL 6554372 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2012). 
 175. CMA-CGM (Am.), Inc. v. Empire Truck Lines, Inc., No. 01-12-00354-CV, 2013 WL 
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personal injury and indemnity regarding a truck driver’s injury when a 
new chassis was being attached to his truck. Acquire, the driver, sued 
Empire (his employer) and CMA (the chassis owner). CMA filed a cross-
claim against Empire under the Uniform Intermodal Interchange and 
Facilities Access Agreement, which CMA argued required Empire to 
defend and indemnify CMA.176 The Intermodal Agreement had a Maryland 
choice-of-law clause. After Acquire settled with CMA and Empire, the trial 
court granted summary judgment to Empire, finding that CMA’s defense/
indemnity claim was not enforceable.177 CMA won reversal on appeal, 
arguing that the trial court failed to apply Maryland law as chosen by the 
parties.178 As part of the appeal, Empire raised the point (not argued 
below) that Maryland law violated the Texas Transportation Code’s 
limitations on indemnity provisions, which it argued was a fundamental 
Texas policy.179 The court of appeals declined to rule on that argument but 
directed that it be considered on retrial. On remand, the trial court again 
ruled for Empire on a finding that Maryland law contravened Texas policy 
as codified in the Transportation Code.180 In a careful application of 
DeSantis, the court of appeals affirmed, finding that Maryland law 
contravened a fundamental Texas policy and that Texas had a materially 
greater interest than Maryland.181 
Solotko v. LegalZoom.com, Inc.182 is a good example of a choice-of-law 
clause affecting class action formation. It further shows the importance of 
a Restatement section187 analysis that a contractually-designated law 
cannot be applied without considering the possibly greater interests of 
other affected jurisdictions. This was an attempted class action for 
overcharged filing fees on a trademark application website. During the 
pertinent time period it was possible to file under two federal trademark 
laws, one with a $275 fee and the other a $325 fee. Legalzoom’s website 
stated that the government filing fee was $325 for both.183 Solotko filed a 
nationwide class action in a Texas state court, alleging violations under 
California law which Legalzoom’s contract with its users (the putative 
class) identified as controlling.184 In denying class formation, the court 
explained the burden on the party proposing the class to furnish 
information on the laws of all affected states where members live.185 Even 
though there was a contractual choice-of-law clause arguably governing 
 
3422666 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 9, 2013, no pet.). 
 176. Id. at *1. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at *2 (referring to TEX. TRANS. CODE ANN. § 623.0155 (West 2011)). 
 180. Id. at *3. 
 181. Id. at *9–17 (applying DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1990)). 
 182. Solotko v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., No. 03-10-00755-CV, 2013 WL 3724770 (Tex. 
App.—Austin July 11, 2013, pet. denied). 
 183. Id. at *1 (referring to the Trademark Electronic Application Service (TEAS, a $275 
fee) and the TEAS Plus (a $325 fee)). 
 184. Id. at *1 n.1. 
 185. Id. 
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defendant’s conduct, the court explained that the potential governing law 
does not do away with the requirement of conducting a fifty-state analysis 
to see if the chosen law violates other states’ fundamental policies.186 
Giner v. Estate of Higgins187 was a claim by an attorney and an 
accountant for their contractual fees for the title transfer of a 
manufacturing site in Juarez, Mexico. The transfer was from one 
corporation to another, both owned by Higgins. Plaintiffs, an accountant 
and a lawyer and both Mexican citizens, sued to collect fees for their 
participation in a series of title transfers.188 The series of transactions 
(allegedly fraudulent, which is irrelevant here), began in 2004.189 Higgins 
died in 2009 without paying plaintiffs, who sued his estate and another 
defendant in 2011.190 The disputed agreement on which plaintiffs claimed 
fees designated the “Laws of the United Mexican States” as controlling. 
Ruling on summary judgment motions from all parties, the court noted the 
distinction between Mexican federal law and the law of the State of 
Chihuahua, and further noted that in Mexico, commercial matters such as 
this one are governed by federal law.191 Applying the Restatement, the 
court found that Mexican law had a reasonable relationship to the dispute, 
that the applicable law was not contrary to a fundamental policy of Texas, 
and that Mexican law favored plaintiffs’ recovery.192 
Justice Hecht’s opinion in DeSantis is the model for law-clause analyses 
in Texas. DeSantis rejected a Florida law clause that validated a non-
compete agreement for services performed in Houston.193 Two non-
compete cases during the Survey-period also provide choice-of-law clause 
analysis, each case choosing Texas law over the chosen laws of New 
York194 and Delaware.195 
Two cases gave examples of the interaction of choice-of-law clauses 
 
 186. Id. at *4–7. 
 187. Giner v. Estate of Higgins, No. EP-11-CV-126-KC, 2012 WL 123973 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 
13, 2012). 
 188. Id. at *1. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at *3. 
 191. Id. at *5. 
 192. Id. at *5–13. As to the reasonable relation, the court recited that the agreement was 
entered in Mexico for a sale of property in Mexico, several of the parties were Mexican 
citizens, and contained confidentiality obligations to non-contracting entities in Mexico. As 
to Mexican law not contradicting a more-interested state’s fundamental interests, the court 
simply noted that none of the parties had argued that. Id. at *4. 
 193. DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1990). 
 194. Drennan v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 367 S.W.3d 288 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 
2013) (employment contract’s “detrimental activity” clause was impermissible non-
compete agreement under Texas law), rev’d, No. 12-0621, 2014 WL 4782974 (Tex. Aug. 29, 
3014) (finding uniformity a worthy goal under the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 
and a logical rationale for choosing New York law, and such choice did not contravene 
fundamental policy in Texas). Reversal came after Survey period. 
 195. Heritage Operating, L.P. v. Rhine Bros., LLC, No. 02-10-00474-CV, 2012 WL 
2344864 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 21, 2012, no pet.) (court of appeals reversed the trial 
court’s application of the contract-designated Delaware law regarding a non-compete 
agreement because Texas had a materially greater interest). 
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with federal law. Dyna Torque Technologies, Inc. v. Helix Energy Solutions 
Group, Inc., an action for breach of contract and related tort claims 
regarding an offshore pipeline construction project, held that a choice of 
law agreement could not create a federal question.196 Diamond Offshore 
Co. v. Survival Systems International, Inc., an action for injuries in an oil rig 
accident attributed to defendant’s faulty equipment, held that a choice-of-
law clause cannot divest federal preemption.197 Considered together, 
Diamond Offshore and Dyna Torque provide bookend rules that choice-of-
law clauses neither create nor destroy federal questions.198 
Other valuable points raised during the Survey-period include that in 
addition to preemption by another state’s fundamental interests, choice-
of-law clauses may be preempted by federal law,199 and that disclaimers in 
employee handbooks stating that the handbooks are not contracts may 
invalidate the handbooks’ designation of law.200 
2.  Contracts Not Designating a Governing Law 
The Survey-period produced only two contract cases not involving a 
choice-of-law clause, compared with forty-eight involving law clauses. 
Two reasons for the disparity come to mind, one good, one bad, neither 
provable. The good reason is that more contracts now include law clauses. 
The bad reason is that parties litigating multi-jurisdictional claims on 
contracts lacking law clauses do not routinely consider raising a choice-of-
law issue. 
Both cases involved inadequate responses to motions to dismiss, one at 
the law level and the second at the factual level. The two cases were well-
analyzed by the respective courts and bear mentioning here only because 
of the lessons in various parties’ inadequate advocacy. 
Murthy v. Abbott Laboratories201 was a pharmaceutical products liability 
action raising both contract and tort claims. Abbott moved to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim and made its argument under Texas law.202 
Although all the pertinent facts were centered in Texas—plaintiff’s 
residence from first dosage through follow-up treatment—plaintiff’s 
 
 196. Dyna Torque Techs., Inc. v. Helix Energy Solutions Grp., Inc., No. 4:12-CV-1529, 
2013 WL 1204927 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 20, 2013). The court added the point that until the court 
had subject matter jurisdiction, it lacked authority to determine which law governed the 
claims, and that the parties obviously could not confer that jurisdiction on their own. Id. at 
*4. 
 197. Diamond Offshore Co. v. Survival Sys. Int’l, Inc., 902 F. Supp. 2d 912, 935–40 (S.D. 
Tex. 2012). 
 198. See Dyna Torque, 2013 WL 1204927; Diamond Offshore, 902 F. Supp. 2d 912. 
 199. Shamrock Foods Co. v. Munn & Assocs., Ltd., 392 S.W.3d 839, 843 n.2 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2013, no pet.) (choice of law clause preempted by the contract’s arbitration 
clause and the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14(2012)). 
 200. Little v. Technical Specialty Prods., LLC, No. 4:11-CV-717, 2012 WL 695719, at *3 
n.2 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2012). The court further found that even though the handbook’s choice 
of law clause was invalid as such, that Louisiana law might nonetheless govern the 
employer’s claim to force arbitration. Id. at *4. 
 201. Murthy v. Abbott Labs., 847 F. Supp. 2d 958 (S.D. Tex. 2012). 
 202. Id. at 965–67. 
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response was that she would assume arguendo that Texas law applied, 
and she raised no other choice-of-law arguments.203 In spite of plaintiff’s 
weak response, the court thoroughly listed the Restatement factors 
governing tort and contract claims, then in one paragraph listed the Texas 
contacts that supported applying Texas law under which plaintiff’s 
contract action survived but her tort claim did not.204 The one paragraph 
was adequate in light of the absence of contrary argument or facts, but 
was unnecessary in light of the presumption that forum law governs 
absent any showing to the contrary.205 
National Oilwell Varco, L.P. v. Elite Coil Tubing Solutions, LLC206 was a 
contract action for failure to pay for pipe, but the issue at bar was 
defendant’s counterclaim for faulty pipe. National Oilwell, the pipe seller, 
is headquartered in Louisiana and Elite Tubing is based in Texas where 
the damage occurred.207 Elite Tubing alleged its claims under Louisiana 
contract and tort law, and National Oilwell moved to dismiss with the 
argument that Texas law controlled and did not support Elite Tubing’s 
claims.208 Unlike Murthy’s acquiescence on Abbott Labs’ choice of law 
argument, Elite argued for Louisiana law under Restatement section 188, 
that is, supporting the contract but not the tort claims.209 The court noted 
that Elite’s counterclaims sounded in tort and then examined the pertinent 
Restatement sections for both tort and contract.210 None of the court’s 
work mattered, though, because neither party had argued sufficient 
supporting facts to enable the court to apply the Restatement often place-
centered factors.211 Because of the factual inadequacies, the court denied 
National Oilwell’s motion without prejudice.212 
3.  Torts 
Choice-of-law in tort cases is directed by Restatement section 145, a 
four-factor test prioritizing (1) the injury situs, (2) the conduct situs, (3) 
the parties’ “domicile residence, nationality, place of incorporation and 
place of business,” and (4) the situs of the parties’ relationship, if any.213 
Section 145 is augmented by forty additional tort sections addressing 
 
 203. Id. at 967. Plaintiff apparently now lives in Massachusetts. See id. at 964 n.2. 
 204. Id. at 966–67. 
 205. TEX. R. EVID. 202 allows a Texas court to take judicial notice of sister states’ laws on 
its own motion and requires it to do so upon a party’s motion, but parties must supply 
“sufficient information” for the court to comply. See, e.g., Ogletree v. Crates, 363 S.W.2d 431, 
435 (Tex. 1963) (applying TEX. R. CIV. P. 184a, the predecessor to TEX. R. EVID. 202). 
 206. Nat’l Oilwell Varco, L.P. v. Elite Coil Tubing Solutions, LLC, No. 4:13-cv-00374, 2013 
WL 4735574 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2013). 
 207. Id. at *3. 
 208. Id. at *2. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at *3 n.2. The court discussed Restatement section 188 for contracts, and 
sections 6, 145, and 147 (injury to land) for the tort claims. Id. at *2–3. 
 211. Id. at *3. 
 212. Id. at *3–5. 
 213. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971). 
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specific claims such as fraud,214 or issues common to torts such as 
standard of care.215 As noted in the introduction, Texas case law is 
showing a better application of these Restatement sections.216 This is not 
to say that opinions failing to use those sections reach an incorrect result 
or that the use of those sections is necessary for the correct results. It is to 
say that the Restatement is structured with presumptions keyed to 
specific claims or issues, and the use of those presumptions adds a good 
measure of the predictability inherent in the First Restatement and its lex 
loci rules. Application of these presumptions could dispel criticisms of the 
most-significant relationship test’s reputation for unpredictability. 
Sulak v. American Europcoter Corp.217 offers the most thorough analysis 
in the Survey-period and shows the proper analytical sequence for 
Restatement analysis. Sulak died in a helicopter crash in Hawaii and his 
survivors sued the helicopter’s French manufacturer and Texas owner.218 
The court first rejected arguments for Hawaii law as governing 
subsequent remedial measures and defendants’ wish to implead a third 
party; both were procedural issues governed by forum law, in this case 
federal.219 As to the case’s substantive issues, the court noted the 
presumption in Restatement sections 175 and 178 favoring the accident’s 
situs law for wrongful death unless another law has a more significant 
relationship.220 Applying Restatement sections 145 and then 6, the court 
considered Texas law (argued by defendants) and French law (which the 
parties neither argued nor presented evidence for), and chose Hawaii law 
as the accident’s situs.221 
In spite of Sulak’s accurate disposition of its procedural issues as 
governed by forum law, there are times when party joinder and indemnity 
are governed by another state’s law.222 Insurance Co. of State of 
Pennsylvania v. Neese223 is a good example how intervention can have a 
greater mix of underlying substantive law. The case was a wrongful death 
claim from a pipeline explosion in Texas, where the decedent and his 
employer were from Oklahoma but several other defendants were from 
Texas.224 The Dallas Court of Appeals applied Restatement sections 145 
and 185 to decide that Oklahoma law governed intervention because of 
the insurer’s relation with the decedent’s employer.225 
 
 214. Id. § 148. 
 215. Id. § 157. 
 216. See supra text accompanying note 3. 
 217. Sulak v. Am. Europcoter Corp., 901 F. Supp. 2d 834 (N.D. Tex. 2012). 
 218. Id. at 837. 
 219. Id. at 838–41. 
 220. Id. at 842. 
 221. Id. at 842–46. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Ins. Co. of State of Pa. v. Neese, 407 S.W.3d 850 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.). 
 224. Id. at 852. 
 225. Id. at 853–54. 
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Engine Components, Inc. v. A.E.R.O. Aviation Co.226 did the same with 
indemnity. This was the crash of a Cessna aircraft in Wisconsin which 
killed three Wisconsin residents.227 As a corollary to a wrongful death 
claim in Ohio, defendant A.E.R.O. sued ECI in Texas seeking indemnity.228 
After the Texas trial court rejected ECI’s summary judgment motion under 
Wisconsin law, A.E.R.O. later won a judgment for costs in the Wisconsin 
suit.229 The Texas court of appeals reversed and rendered in ECI’s favor, 
holding that under Restatement sections 6, 145, and 173, Wisconsin law 
governed indemnity for the Wisconsin lawsuit.230 
Janvey v. Suarez231 illustrates a different Restatement presumption—
that unproven foreign law is the same as forum law. Janvey was an action 
by the receiver for the Stanford Financial Group (Stanford) to recoup 
money transferred to defendant Suarez, who was Stanford’s chief of 
staff.232 On state law claims for fraudulent transfer, Suarez argued for 
Florida law and plaintiffs for Texas law.233 Suarez failed to supply the 
court with any evidence that Florida law differed from Texas, and the 
court thus applied the presumption that unproven foreign law is the same 
as that of the forum state.234 
Three other Survey-period cases applied Restatement presumptions 
favoring the situs law of the tort after analyzing whether another state had 
a more significant relationship: (1) Indiana products liability law 
compelled denial of defendant’s summary judgment motion in a claim for 
a child’s fall from an infant seat;235 (2) Ohio law governed a slip-and-fall 
claim arising in Ohio but where the victim had treatment and ongoing 
injury at his home in Texas;236 and (3) Texas defamation law governed a 
Houston doctor’s claim based on a disparaging email sent from Missouri to 
recipients in Missouri, Wisconsin, and Texas.237 
C.  FEDERAL CHOICE-OF-LAW RULES 
Federal common law has various choice-of-law rules for use in federal 
 
 226. Engine Components, Inc. v. A.E.R.O. Aviation Co., No. 04-10-00812-CV, 2012 WL 
666648 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 29, 2012, pet. denied). 
 227. Id. at *1. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at *1–5. 
 231. Janvey v. Suarez, No. 3:10-CV-02581-N, 2013 WL 5663107 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 17. 2013). 
 232. Id. at *1–2. 
 233. Id. at *2–3. 
 234. Id. at *3–4. 
 235. O’Neal v. Bumbo Int’l Trust, No. 6:11-CV-72, 2013 WL 4083281, at *2 (S.D. Tex., Aug. 
1, 2013) (applying RESTATEMENT sections 6, 145, & 156 (presumption favoring situs law for 
personal injury claims)). 
 236. Hooper v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., No. 3:12-CV-5078-G, 2013 WL 5786294, at *2–6 (N.D. 
Tex. Oct. 28, 2013) (applying RESTATEMENT sections 6, 145, & 156 (presumption favoring 
situs law for personal injury claims)). 
 237. Tyson v. Austin Eating Disorders Partners, LLC, No. A-13-CA-180-SS, 2013 WL 
3197641, at *1, *5–6 (W.D. Tex. June 21, 2013). 
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question cases having a gap that requires using non-federal law. 
Bankruptcy law has the “independent judgment rule” which provides that 
when bankruptcy obligations involve claims arising under multiple states’ 
laws, the choice of governing law “requires the exercise of an informed 
judgment in the balancing of all the interests of the states with the most 
significant contacts in order best to accommodate the equities among the 
parties to the policies of those states.”238 This rule, however, is subject to 
circuit splits. The Fifth Circuit, for example, has not decided in bankruptcy 
cases whether to use the independent judgment rule or the forum state’s 
choice-of-law rule.239 This conflict between these choice-of-law rules was 
at issue in three cases during the Survey-period, all of which found it to be 
a false conflict. That is, federal common law uses factors similar to and 
sometimes interchangeable with those in the Restatement. The lack of a 
conflict in these cases does not mean, however, that the differing circuit 
views will always produce the same result. 
In re Mirant Corp.240was an action by the debtor to avoid guaranties 
made in a failed venture. The basis for the guaranty avoidance was 
fraudulent transfer.241 The debtor company was based in Georgia but the 
lenders were not.242 The bankruptcy court concluded that New York law 
governed, but the federal district court reversed under an independent-
judgment-rule analysis (using Restatement sections 6 and 145) that 
Georgia law had the stronger interest.243 Georgia law favored the lenders 
and the trial court dismissed the debtor’s claims.244 The Fifth Circuit 
reversed, noting that the intangible nature of the injury minimized the 
relevance of the section 145 factors which are (1) the injury situs, (2) the 
injury-causing conduct situs, (3) the parties’ domicile, residence, 
nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business, and (4) the place 
where the parties’ relationship is centered.245 The court held instead that 
the injury’s intangible nature made the section 145 factors difficult to 
assess and should yield to the policy of helping injured parties rather than 
deterring conduct.246 The court accordingly turned to the broader 
balancing factors in Restatement section 6 which pointed to New York 
law.247 Two other Survey opinions noted the similarity of the two 
bankruptcy conflicts rules in choosing North Carolina law over those of 
 
 238. Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 161–62 (1946). 
 239. See MC Asset Recovery LLC v. Commerzbank A.G. (In Re Mirant Corp.), 675 F.3d 
530, 537 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at 532. 
 242. Id. at 532, 538 
 243. MC Asset Recovery LLC v. Commerzbank A.G., 441 B.R. 791, 810–12 (Bankr. N.D. 
Tex. 2010). 
 244. Id. at 804–12. 
 245. In re Mirant, 675 F.3d at 537–38 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 
§ 145 (1971)). 
 246. Id. at 537. 
 247. Id. at 537–38 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 cmt. c (1971) 
and remanding to the district court for application of New York law). 
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Delaware, Texas, and Georgia in a wrongful distribution claim,248 and 
Texas rather than Colorado law in a fraudulent transfer claim.249 
Another federal-common-law rule arose to defeat a third-party claim in 
a criminal forfeiture action. United States v. 2004 Ferrari 360 Modeno250 
was the forfeiture of a car seized in a conspiracy to pass counterfeit 
money. Evens Claude came from Pennsylvania to Houston and bought the 
car that was later seized after his arrest for possession of counterfeit 
money.251 When the government filed an in rem action to seize the car, 
Claude’s mother, Josette Claude, intervened to claim an ownership interest 
even though her name was not on the title.252 She argued that Texas law 
controlled as the site of the seizure, and under Texas law she was an 
innocent bailee because the money used for the car was hers.253 The court 
noted that Texas no longer recognized a joint-venture corporate form that 
could establish bailment.254 Pennsylvania law, however, did recognize that 
form.255 On the issue of ownership interest, the court held that 
Pennsylvania law governed under a federal-common-law choice-of-law 
rule that the law of the jurisdiction creating the property right determines 
a claimant’s legal interest256 and that Claude’s claim failed because her son 
was the car’s only legal owner.257 On Claude’s second claim based on 
bailment, the court found a false conflict between Texas and Pennsylvania 
law, both defeating Claude’s claim.258 
W & T Offshore, Inc. v. Apache Corp.259 is a well-done analysis of the 
complex federal choice-of-law rule for non-federal claims arising under 
the Outer Continental Shelf Land Act (OCSLA).260 W & T alleged that 
Apache breached a production handling agreement by misallocating oil 
from W & T’s Gulf platforms, including instances of fraud and related 
state-law torts by misrepresenting those allocations.261 For the state law 
claims, the OCSLA directs that such claims be controlled by the law of the 
adjacent state, which are incorporated into federal common law for the 
purposes of that case.262 To fall under this rule, the torts must be 
 
 248. Crescent Res. Litig. Trust v. Duke Energy Corp., 500 B.R. 464, 483 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 
2013). 
 249. Feuerbacher v. Moser, No. 4:11-CV-272, 2012 WL 1070138, at *9–10 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 
29, 2012). 
 250. United States v. 2004 Ferrari 360 Modeno, 902 F. Supp. 2d 944 (S.D. Tex. 2012). 
 251. Id. at 948. 
 252. Id. at 947–48. 
 253. Id. at 948–49. 
 254. Id. at 953. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. at 953–54. 
 258. Id. at 955–57. 
 259. W & T Offshore, Inc. v. Apache Corp., 918 F. Supp. 2d 601 (S.D. Tex. 2013). 
 260. 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(1) (2012). 
 261. W & T Offshore, 918 F. Supp. 2d at 604. 
 262. Id. at 609–10. 
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committed on a fixed platform anchored to the seabed.263 The court did a 
lengthy analysis of the function of the OCSLA choice-of-law rule and the 
case law confusion surrounding the concept of where the events occurred, 
giving rise to the claims.264 The court found that in spite of the lack of clear 
direction from precedent, the events giving rise to the claims occurred 
sufficiently on the fixed platform to point to the application of Louisiana 
law as surrogate federal law.265 
D.  OTHER CHOICE-OF-LAW ISSUES 
Taylor v. Tesco Corp. (US)266 offered an informative example of the need 
to apply another state’s choice-of-law methodology. The action was for a 
worker’s injuries on an oil rig off the coast of Mexico, originally filed in 
federal court in Louisiana and transferred on an inconvenient forum 
motion to the Southern District of Texas.267 Such intra-federal transfers of 
diversity cases require the transferee court to apply the transferor court’s 
choice-of-law rule.268 The issue here was a motion to sever by various 
insurers which was opposed by the primary defendants.269 The opinion is 
a good application of Louisiana’s comparative impairment choice-of-law 
test, and also illustrates the function of a choice-of-law analysis in a 
motion to sever.270 
The choice-of-law function generally applies to substantive legal 
matters and not procedure, which is generally governed by forum law. 
 Two Survey-period cases reach opposite but correct results in the 
substance/procedure dichotomy, both considering attorney fees. Man 
Industries (India) Ltd. v. Midcontinent Express Pipeline, LLC271 was a series 
of claims, counterclaims, and crossclaims among parties to a pipeline 
purchase agreement, along with the bank which financed the agreement. 
One issue was the bank’s request for attorney fees and expenses after 
prevailing on its declaratory judgment action that it had not wrongfully 
dishonored a letter of credit.272 Plaintiff Man Industries argued that New 
York law, which governed the letter of credit, did not provide for attorney 
fees.273 Both the trial and appellate courts disagreed, holding that the 
 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 609–14. 
 265. Id. at 613–14. For a more straightforward application based on simpler facts, see In 
re Seahawk Drilling, Inc., No. 11-20089, 2012 WL 1123864, at *2–4 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Mar. 
30, 2012); SM Energy Co. v. Smackco, Ltd., No. 11-cv-3028, 2012 WL 4760841, at *4 (S.D. 
Tex. Oct. 5, 2012). 
 266. Taylor v. Tesco Corp. (US), No. H-11-00517, 2012 WL 4470461 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 
2012). 
 267. Id. at *1. 
 268. Id. at *3 (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 243 n.8 (1981)).  
 269. Id. at *1. 
 270. Id. at *3 (applying LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3537 (2011)). 
 271. Man Indus. (India) Ltd. v. Midcontinent Express Pipeline, LLC, 407 S.W.3d 342 (Tex. 
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied). 
 272. Id. at 345–46. 
 273. Id. at 354–55. 
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bank’s entitlement to fees was based on the Texas Uniform Declaratory 
Judgment Act, that is, the issue was a matter of forum procedure and not 
based on substantive law.274 
HealthTronics Inc. v. Lisa Laser USA, Inc.275 held in contrast that 
California law governed the issue of admissibility of evidence to prove 
attorney fees in a contract dispute. The court explained that although 
forum law ordinarily governs procedure, another state’s law is 
appropriate if “the primary purpose of the relevant rule of the state of the 
otherwise applicable law is to affect decision of the issue rather than to 
regulate the conduct of the trial.”276 
III.  FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 
Foreign judgments from other states and countries create Texas 
conflict-of-laws issues in two ways: (1) their local enforcement,277 and (2) 
their preclusive effect on local lawsuits. Page limits preclude any detailed 
discussion beyond brief statements of holdings of the more notable 
foreign judgment cases in the twenty-four month Survey-period. 
A.  SISTER-STATE JUDGMENTS 
Liberty Bank, F.S.B. v. Etter278 is an interesting example of rejecting 
enforcement of an earlier judgment based on subsequent collateral 
judgment. Etter leased telecommunications equipment from NonVergence 
 
 274. Id. at. 352–55; see also Thygesen v. Strange, Nos. 14-09-00866-CV:4-10-0324-CV, 
2013 WL 2247381, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 21, 2013, pet. denied) 
(holding entitlement to jury trial controlled by forum law and not Delaware law) (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 129 (1971)). 
 275. HealthTronics Inc. v. Lisa Laser USA, Inc., 382 S.W.3d 567 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, 
no pet.). 
 276. Id. at 579 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 133 (1971)). 
 277. Texas recognizes two methods of enforcing foreign judgments: the common-law 
method using the foreign judgment as the basis for a local lawsuit, and since 1981, the more 
direct procedure under the two uniform judgments acts. The underlying mandate for the 
common-law enforcement is the full faith and credit clause of the U.S. Constitution, U.S. 
CONST. art. IV, § 1, and its statutory counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012). The Uniform 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act specifically reserves the common-law method as an 
alternative. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.008 (West 2008). Under the two 
uniform acts, sister-state judgments are enforced under the Uniform Enforcement of 
Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA). TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 35.001–.003 (West 
2008), 35.004 (West Supp. 2013), 35.005–.008 (West 2008). Foreign-country judgments for 
money are enforced under the Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act 
(UFCMJRA). TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.001–.008 (West 2008). Texas laws also 
provide for enforcement of (1) arbitration awards (Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-
307 (2012)); Texas International Arbitration Act (TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 
172.082(f) (West 2011)); (2) child custody decisions (TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.303 (West 
2008)); and (3) child support awards (TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 159.601 (West 2008)). Federal 
judgments may be enforced in any other federal district as local judgments. See 28 U.S.C. § 
1963 (2012). Federal judgments may also be enforced as sister-state judgments in Texas 
state courts. See id. § 1963. 
 278. Liberty Bank, F.S.B. v. Etter, No. 02-12-00337-CV, 2013 WL 5302719 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth, Sept. 19, 2013, pet. filed). 
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who then assigned the lease to Liberty Bank.279 The equipment was faulty 
and Etter ceased payments, leading to Liberty Bank obtaining an Iowa 
judgment against Etter for the defaulted lease.280 In the meantime, the 
Texas Attorney General brought a consumer action against NonVergence 
and obtained a judgment nullifying Etter’s and other consumers’ leases.281 
When Liberty Bank sought to enforce the Iowa judgment in Texas, the 
appellate court affirmed the trial court’s rejection of the Iowa judgment 
based on the Attorney General’s intervening judgment.282 
Two Survey-period cases involved judgment debtors’ attempted 
relitigation of personal jurisdiction in the judgment-rendering state. In 
Peters v. Top Gun Executive Group,283 Houston-based Top Gun had 
contracted with New Jersey resident Peters to assist in job searches in 
New York and New Jersey. Peters eventually sued Top Gun in a New Jersey 
court for breach of contract, fraud, and related claims, and Top Gun 
defaulted.284 When Peters attempted enforcement in Texas, the Texas trial 
court rejected the New Jersey judgment, finding that Top Gun was not 
subject to New Jersey jurisdiction in its contract to assist a New Jersey 
resident in finding employment in New Jersey or New York.285 The Texas 
court of appeals reversed and rendered after conducting a detailed review 
of the trial record’s recitation of Top Gun’s contacts and the resulting 
jurisdiction under the New Jersey long-arm statute and due process.286 
The court conducted a similar analysis in Chaseekhalili v. Cinemacar 
Leasing, Inc. to affirm the trial court’s finding that New York had personal 
jurisdiction over judgment debtor, based on proper service of process 
leading to default judgment.287 
In other cases, Texas courts of appeal refused a North Carolina probate 
court’s determination of a will’s validity, based on Texas’s exclusive 
jurisdiction over the decedent’s real property in Texas;288 and affirmed 
the enforcement of an Indiana judgment, rejecting the judgment debtor’s 
challenge that proper authentication required certification on every 
page.289 
 
 279. Id. at *1. 
 280. Id. at *2. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. at *2–5. 
 283. Peters v. Top Gun Exec. Grp., 396 S.W.3d 57 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, 
no pet.). 
 284. Id. at 60. 
 285. Id. at 60–61. 
 286. Id. at 60–61, 72. 
 287. Chaseekhalili v. Cinemacar Leasing, Inc., No. 02-11-00454-CV, 2012 WL 3207247, at 
*1–3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 9, 2012, pet. denied). 
 288. Haga v. Thomas, 409 S.W.3d 731, 732–33, 738 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 
2013, pet. filed). 
 289. Whitehead v. Bulldog Battery Corp., 400 S.W.3d 115, 116–19 (Tex. App.—Dallas 
2013, pet denied). 
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B.  FOREIGN COUNTY JUDGMENTS 
New Hampshire Insurance Co. v. Magellan Reinsurance Co.290 was a 
judgment from the Turks and Caicos Islands for reimbursement of fees 
and costs in New Hampshire. Pursuant to Magellan’s business wind up in 
the Turks and Caicos Islands, New Hampshire Insurance Company (NHIC) 
filed a claim.291 After several stages of litigation, NHIC lost and was 
assessed fees and costs for the litigation.292 Magellan filed its Turks and 
Caicos Islands judgment in a state court in Fort Worth where the trial 
court approved enforcement over NHIC’s objection that the foreign 
judgment was for a penalty and thus improper.293 The trial court 
disagreed and found instead that it was a proper money judgment 
enforceable in Texas, and the court of appeals affirmed.294 In Presley v. N.V. 
Masureel Veredeling, the court enforced a Belgian judgment, rejecting the 
judgment debtor’s argument that the Belgian court improperly ignored an 
arbitration clause.295 
C.  PRECLUSION 
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co.296 is 
an interesting and well-reasoned application of full faith and credit to a 
Massachusetts court’s application of Illinois law to interpret an insurance 
policy. The Massachusetts case was for asbestos liability, with subsequent 
litigation in Texas for reimbursement of Chicago Bridge’s litigation 
expenses.297 The Texas trial court granted Chicago Bridge’s motion for 
partial summary judgment based on issue preclusion of coverage issues 
litigated in Massachusetts.298 The insurer appealed, arguing that the issues 
in the Texas reimbursement case differed on several points.299 In a 
meticulous analysis of the identity of the issues and other preclusion 
elements, the court of appeals rejected this argument and affirmed the 
trial court’s ruling.300 
In other Survey-period cases, a Texas court of appeals applied claim 
preclusion to find that plaintiff’s prior arbitration in Kentucky was 
dispositive of her claim in Texas for breach of fiduciary duty regarding 
 
 290. N.H. Ins. Co. v. Magellan Reinsurance Co., No. 02-11-00334-CV, 2013 WL 105654 
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 10, 2013, pet. denied). 
 291. Id. at *1. 
 292. Id. at *1–2. 
 293. Id. at *2, *11. 
 294. Id. at *3–11. 
 295. Presley v. N.V. Masureel Veredeling, 370 S.W.3d 425, 431, 434 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.). 
 296. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Chi. Bridge & Iron Co., 406 S.W.3d 326 
(Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013, pet. denied). 
 297. Id. at 329–30. 
 298. Id. at 330. 
 299. Id. at 332. 
 300. Id. 
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estate distributions,301 and two federal district courts held that (1) prior 
Colorado litigation of the accounting for the insurance policy deductible 
precluded relitigation between insurer and insured in a subsequent Texas 
action for reimbursement of litigation costs;302 and the fraud issue 
decided in Colorado litigation did not preclude relitigation in Texas 
because the Colorado default judgment did not meet the actually-litigated 
requirement.303 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The 2012 Survey’s conclusion noted that Texas courts would need to 
reassess their calculation for stream-of-commerce and general 
jurisdiction.304 In this Survey-period, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reaffirmed its pro-jurisdiction application of stream-of-commerce 
jurisdiction with a convincing distinction of the volume-sale facts in 
Ainsworth from the far narrower facts in McIntyre.305 In choice of law, the 
Survey-period showed an ongoing tendency toward two trends—the 
unfortunate acceptance of choice-of-law clauses without the required 
scrutiny, 306 and a healthy trend toward an ever-increasing sophistication 
in applying the many aspects of Restatement analysis, particularly in tort 
law, a practice which adds stability and predictability to the otherwise 
seemingly open-ended balancing factors of the most significant 
relationship test.307 Overall, the two-year Survey-period showed the 
ongoing breadth and depth, much of it omitted from this report, of conflict 
of laws as a pervasive feature of Texas adjudication. 
 
 301. Wall v. Orr, No. 05-12-00369-CV, 2013 WL 3956664, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 
30, 2013, pet. denied). 
 302. Trammell Crow Residential Co. v. Am. Prot. Ins. Co, No. 3:10-CV-2163-B, 2012 WL 
4174898, at *7–8 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 2012). 
 303. Alan Bau Invs. V. Horne (In re Horne), No. 10-42625, 2012 WL 1205796, at *4 
(Bankr. E.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2012). 
 304. See George et al., supra note 5 at 421. 
 305. See supra notes 5–20 and accompanying text. 
 306. See supra notes 153–65 and accompanying text. 
 307. See supra notes 213–37 and accompanying text. 
